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Messages - derdiktator

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31
Except for the USA & Russian "mandatory" factories, building factories seems to me to ONLY make sense if started pretty much turn one or turn two (I'll make some allowance for a German or Brit turn 3 start, but have serious doubts) - the cost is just too horrendous and payback period too long otherwise, IMHO.

However, I do think there is a strong argument for building a second German factory (started the second or possibly third turn).  The seeming rationale for not doing so is that the PP are much more critically needed for preparing for Barbarossa.  However, Barbarossa does not effectively get underway until late 1941 or early 1942 - in most games, the Russian player is busily beating a hasty retreat into the interior of Mother Russia the first two or three turns of Barbarossa, largely refusing significant combat (or at least that seems to be the common occurrence - standing and fighting early usually seems a losing gambit).  Of course, fewer German units may encourage a tougher initial Russian stance, but then again, maybe not.

As such, assuming a second factory can be started even as late as the third turn of the game, it breaks even in Winter 41-42 and which is when combat seems to start in earnest on the Eastern Front and when the ground units are actually needed (and not really before).  In fact, given all the givens, pushing the break-even to Spring '42 seems tolerable (i.e., starting the second factory turn 4), given the big win that five extra production points provides forever and ever.

The trade-off is whether or not the Germans can do without the extra ground units during 1940 and early 1941.  From what I've seen, I think that the Germans usually have a breathing spell and can in fact usually do without the extra six-to-eight ground units a factory costs during Fall-of-France to Barbarossa. By the time they get Barbarossa really going (Spring '42), they will have built all the "lost" units and in fact then start to get ahead of the game.

In fact, it has been my experience that with two German factories, the extra ten PP goes largely to being able to build subs or other things to work on keeping the Brits in check and which I think is utterly critical to the Germans – something has to be done to keep the Brits in check else they always seem to torpedo the Germans by sometime in 1943 if not earlier. 

Of course, building two early factories does indeed call for incredible fortitude - dare I say guts - on the part of the German.  But, I think the German HAS to play for the long haul, looking towards 1942 and 1943 almost right from the first turn. 

All I can say is that I have never ever regretted a single German Factory that I've built.  I even used to build four German factories when they cost only 5 PP per turn - but the increase to six PP per turn has discouraged even me from buidling more than just two.

dd

32
Strategy Tips / Re: U.S. Production
« on: March 27, 2006, 05:04:34 AM »
I still have my doubts about maxing lend lease to the Brits pre Pearl Harbor.  I think the Brits certainly need the lend lease, but the US also needs to prepare against the Japanese.  The last two games I played as the Japs, the US had nothing prepared against me and I (as the Japs)  pretty much wound up owning the Pacific sufficient to force an Axis victory in 1943 (albeit with a little help from miscellaneous SS parachuting into Moscow in the one game...). 

I basically concur with the 1942 US builds you suggest, except that I would not build the four DDs, would cut back on lend lease a bit (say 6-10 points), and use the freed up production to build armor that got pumped into North Africa.

If North Atlantic German subs are a desperate problem, rather than build DDs, I find it works better to send the US carriers into the North Atlantic during 1942 to wipe out the subs. The two times I've done this, German sub production collapsed when the German saw four or five defending North Atlantic fighters chew his sub force to pieces.

Of course then those US carriers aren't out in the Pacific during 1942, but usually they don't do much good out there at that point, and what the heck - there's always trade-offs.

My $0.02 worth,

dd

33
Strategy Tips / The Long Pull - US build strategy (long)
« on: January 27, 2006, 10:39:47 AM »
US Long-term Build Strategy

The following are basically things I sent to John over xmas break prior to whatever game we were preparing for (he Brit, me US) regarding my thoughts on US long-term Pearl-Harbor-and-after production and which I’m reposting here for general exposure.  No need to hold such wonderful pearls of thought private anymore. ;)


In my current thinking, the US Pearl Harbor production turn looks something like the following (see below for the rationale):

- 4 x Fighters (16 pp)
- 3 x light tanks (9 pp)
- 6 pp left over (one sub? or lend lease? I think I incline towards starting the sub assuming the points aren't lost to strategic attacks anyway).

Total: 25 – 31 pp


The turn after Pearl Harbor (Spr '42), the US production track looks something like:

- 8 x fighters (32 pp)
- 3 x subs (12 pp) (assuming one was started in Winter '41-42)
- 6 x inf (18 pp)
- 6 x light tanks (18 pp)
- 10 pp lend lease to Britain/turn
- 9 pp lend lease to Russia/turn
- 4 x transports (20 pp)

Total: 119 pp


Subsequent build turns then go to a steady-state assembly line that looks like the following:

- 8 x fighters (32 pp) – sent against Japan once a sufficient number are accumulated
- 4 x subs (16 pp)   - fastest way there is to bring Japan to its knees

Mostly sent against Germany:
- 6 x inf (18 pp)
- 4 x medium tanks (18 pp) (going to 8 x mediums (24 pp) the following turn)
- 10 pp lend lease to Britain/turn
- 9 pp lend lease to Russia/turn
- 4 x transports (20 pp) (going to 2xtransports (10 pp) the following turn, or possibly staying at 4 x transports, but dropping lend lease to make up the difference)

Total: 119 - 123 pp/turn

All units taking two turns to produce are evenly split across the two turns so there is a constant number appearing each turn (i.e., 4 x tanks, 2 x subs, 4 x fighters, etc., appear each turn).

This plan allows for maxing the US transport builds the first two or three turns to get up to the critical minimum of 14-18 transports in the Western Theatre by the end of 1942 (see below for reasoning on this).


Overall Rationale: I think one key to winning the game (regardless of which side one is playing) is an efficient continuous production system, particularly if your opponent has to dash back and forth switching among production of differing troop types to attempt to meet short-term exigencies.  As such, I prefer a system where there's a steady assembly line of the same number of troops coming off the production line each and every turn and which I think contributes to general overall efficiency.   A steady production rate makes it lots easier to compute production each turn and to plan and anticipate transportation & combat needs without also trying to coordinate such issues backwards into production capabilities. My suggested US builds call for producing 4xfighters, 2xsubs, 4xtanks, 6xinf, & 2xtransports each turn. All subs and most fighters initially head against Japan and the ground troops (mostly) head for England and/or Africa.  Once a sufficient sub force exists against Japan (probably by late 1943 or so), then sub production can be tapered off and/or switched to ground units and/or strategic bombers.

Adjusting priorities: Since there's always need to produce things, short term at least, other than what's on the basic shopping list, I think subs and fighters should be the highest priority the first two years or so, and cut into the ground troops when other things need producing (like more transports, CVs, or DD's or something). When only another one, two or three points are needed to produce the immediately required stray extra unit, then I'd suggest taking it out of lend lease rather than put a hiccup into the assembly line - a smoothly functioning assembly line takes real discipline to keep going, but I think that after six or eight turns of unwavering production it becomes absolute gold what with the unyielding pressure it puts on the enemy.

Transports: The production strategy detailed above calls for something like eight transports just to service the US part of the Atlantic shuttle system (four tanks + 6 inf requiring four transports per turn going over and four transports coming back empty), plus whatever Britain needs itself (say another 3-4 transports or so).  There is a need for another four to six transports to support amphibious landings so as not to impact the shuttle system. This makes for a total of 15-18 transports required just in the Atlantic/Med theatres by late 1942 and which might be tough to produce that many by that point.  (Can you say "world-wide shortage of transport and amphibious capability”? Nothing like history repeating itself ;).  However, the first turn that the US maxes out on production (Spr ’42), there is spare US production because the US will only be starting the first half of the standard two-turn tank production cycle and it can produce a few extra transports at that point as detailed above (and which England might be able to help with also).  Of course the Pacific theatre will require at least a troopship or three itself.  I suspect all this means England must be popping out one or two transports per turn by more or less the time of Pearl Harbor. It also may be that lend lease will have to be thin for a bit.

Mediterranean Strategy: I particularly like the idea of cranking out four US tanks and six US infantry a turn most of which is headed towards the Med to maximize the advantage of being able to mech four infantry with the four tanks once on the ground.  An early and strong tank/infantry force able to mech move every turn should completely devastate Italian North Africa. Once two or three turns of troops have been pumped into North Africa, the Germans will have to start covering against an invasion of the Italian mainland, helping the Eastern Front and probably forcing an abandonment of North Africa. And even at that, I doubt they can keep the Western Allies out of Sicily or the mainland for long.   If the US can keep pumping four tanks into any ground battle every turn they are almost guaranteed to shred the German/Italian armor, no matter what they throw at the US/Brit force. Joe Stalin will be so happy.

Initial US production on the Pearl Harbor turn: The US typically gets 31 production points the Pearl Harbor turn and I am very partial to starting four fighters on the production track at that point to jump start the fighter assembly line.  Starting two subs might be a great idea also, but might be prohibitive given other requirements. It would be awfully nice (in terms of supporting the early invasion against N. Africa) to start the tank production line also - with three light tanks started each of the first two turns of war production (to address the requirement of building three US lights before any medium tanks start building); the US can then transport three tanks into North Africa from the US mainland in the summer and then also the fall of 1942 and which will start an early crimp on the Italians.  As such, it makes sense to do a British North African invasion of Morocco on the Spring 1942 turn so the US tanks can just waltz in without paying amphib costs (which means preparing troops, planes and transports for the Morocco invasion on the Pearl Harbor turn - yikes - THAT'S EARLY!). 

Miscellany: Notice I make no allowance for building more surface combat ships (maybe a CV or two during pre-Pearl Harbor turns?), as the British / US surface combat force starting quota seems generally sufficient if judiciously used. Likewise (unfortunately), this strategy makes no allowance for building up a strategic bomber force until starting late 1943 or so and which may be way too late to be worth bothering.  C’est la vie, c’est la guerre.


Somebody should try this strategy and let me know how it works…

dd


34
Strategy Tips / Thoughts on Axis grand strategy
« on: January 16, 2006, 09:12:08 AM »
An Axis Grand Strategy

[Note: I have slightly revised this posting as of 7/11/06 because it seems I miscounted the number of 'basic' European VP (it seems to be 19, not 18 as I had it in my original posting). Also note that the posting was originally written under rules current in early 2006. Since then there have been some small but probably significant changes affecting game balance and perhaps also affecting Axis strategy such as French redeployment restrictions, slight changes to German set-up, the advent of air bases, etc. At this point, I believe much of the thoughts below are still applicable, but they need further testing against the game as it currently stands.]

These are my current thoughts on how the Axis needs to go about winning the game – subject to subsequent revision, redaction, and refutation, of course…

As I currently see it, the Axis have two basic, non-exclusive ways of winning: Get to the magic VP level of 42 points in the Summer - Winter 1942 turns, or hang on to the bitter end of 1945 with ten VP. Other possibilities of course exist, but based upon actual game-playing experience to-date, the intermediate possibilities do not seem to really come up and/or work. I think the proactive 1942 win strategy is the most viable alternative and certainly the more attractive in forcing an Axis victory.

For a 42 VP win to occur, it really looks like it has to occur in mid-1942 to mid-1943. Getting to the requisite VP after that seems most unlikely given the massive Allied production effects that tend to kick in by late ’42.  (Albeit this last game – mid-Jan 2006 - was won in ‘sleaze overtime’ at the 38 pt VP level in Autumn 1943 thanks to SS parachutists pulling off a dramatic surprise raid on Moscow, arresting Stalin and the entire Politburo, and who then sued for peace to hand an undeserved victory to the Axis. Sleazy, but a victory is a victory… ;) As a simplifying assumption, and because the game design in fact seems to work out this way, I am going to assume that the Italia-Germans and Japanese need to obtain at least 21 VP each, meaning victory is a balanced team effort between the European and Pacific Theatres.

Based upon what seem to be usual developments, the basic German ‘empire’ provides a more-or-less guaranteed ‘starting position’ at the time of Pearl Harbor of some 19 VP: Norway(1), France(3), German/Italy(7), Poland(1), Southern & Eastern Europe(3), Kiev/Kharkov(2), & Italian North Africa(2). For Japan, they start with 10 VP  (China(2), Japan(3), and Japanese Central Pacific(5), with the Japs pretty much guaranteed another immediate eight VP (see below). If the Japs and Germans can pretty much guarantee getting at least their 'basic' VP each, this means the Germans and Japs must pick up five more VP by the end of the first year that the Japs are in the war. (For reference, historically near as I can make out, the Germans maxed at 19 VP while the Japanese got to 16 VP.)

The sections below detail where I think the extra VP have to come from in each Theatre.

German Grand Strategy

The Germans typically can have a lock on 15 VP by the fall of France, and by the time of Pearl Harbor can usually pick up Norway, Greece, and the two western-most Russian VP (Kiev & Kharkov), giving them 19. There are five other sources of VP (listed in order of what seems to be relative frequency in being captured across the games I’ve seen):

1) One of the triggers (one of Spain, Sweden, Turkey)
          (each has one VP, usually only one does in fact trigger) – say 1 VP
2) Cairo – 2 VP
3) Russia – 2 VP or 3 VP, depending on which city is captured  – say 2 VP typically when it happens
     (Typically one of Stalingrad (2 VP) or Moscow (3 VP), sometimes also Baku (2 VP))
4) England - 3 VP
5) Mosul & Southern Persia – 1 VP each – say 2 VP typically when the Italians get this far (note – these are probably easily recaptured by the Russians once taken by the Axis).

Based on what I have seen to-date, I sort of view conquering Russia as a veritably hopeless cause, especially with decent conservative Russian play; if attempted, it sucks in unlimited German resources and leaves the Brits a relatively free hand to harass the Med and defend the Far East. Even with a German max-Barbarosa strategy, it seems all too often that the Russian major-city VP do not fall anyway, or are only held very briefly. A heavy Barbarosa strategy also typically leads to greatly weakening or even ignoring the Battle of the Atlantic and not pushing at all adequately against Cairo. As such, I would propose that Barbarosa not be the major all-out effort of the Germans, but only be sufficient so as to capture and hold the Kiev & Kharkov VP, say throughout 1942. This should free up resources sufficient to enable a thoroughgoing assault against Cairo AND most importantly, allow an all-out Battle of the Atlantic coupled perhaps with a credible Battle of Britain. As such, I propose that the “real” German effort be placed against Britain with just sufficient forces to knock the Russians partially back into their homeland at the start of Barbarosa.

Capturing Cairo also seems to greatly facilitate capturing the other Middle East VP (#5 above - Mosul & Persia – 2VP) and lead to being able to obtain several relatively high probability triggers (#1 Minor Neutrals – 1VP each). Capturing Cairo, with subsequent capture of the other likely triggers (e.g., Greece, Crete, Sinai, Palestine, & Crete) should lead to an almost guaranteed trigger of Turkey or Spain (~95% probability when you multiply everything out in the Axis Minor Allies trigger table). Getting Cairo along with a trigger would put the Germans at their 21+ VP and which is why I advocate a strong Cairo strategy. Capturing the other Mid East VP (#5) would be icing on the cake and insurance against Allied ripostes or Japanese shortfalls. Capturing Cairo also greatly secures the Italian eastern flank – no small matter to protecting Italy.

The direct assault against British production is critical with this strategy because it is only the British who thwart the Cairo strategy and most importantly, who can do much in the way of preparing against the Japanese. Attacking British production is particularly important if the USA does early max British Lend Lease (and which seems like a current favored early US production strategy).

This strategy therefore requires relatively early max German sub production, say starting two subs no latter than Spring 1940 (Winter ’39-40 would be even better). Four subs should always be on the production track each turn thereafter. In addition, the Germans should have at least three or four transports to have a credible invasion threat against England (forcing the Brits to use their diminished production for home guard). Note however, it has been my experience that a serious invasion of England tends to preclude taking taking the Kiev/Kharkov VP because the Barbarossa attack gets so weakened by the assault into England. As such, it is generally to be attempted only should the Brits leave London easy pickings or perhaps as a cheap diversion forcing a disproportionate British response.

Japanese Grand Strategy

While the Japanese technically only start with 10 VP at the time of Pearl Harbor, they typically can pick up eight more: Burma(1) Singapore(1), Philippines (2), Rabaul(1), New Guinea(1), Gaudalcanal(1), & the Gilberts(1) for a ‘base’ total of 18 VP, meaning they really only need three more to get to the magic 21 VP. Sources of possible VP (not listed in any particular order):

1) Calcutta (2 VP) and Ceylon (1 VP)
2) Australia (2 VP)
3) Hawaii (2 VP)
4) Midway (1 VP)
5) Kiska (1 VP)
6) Vladivostok (1 VP) – good to take as a last-second do-or-die manuever

The Japs need at least three (and preferably four VP for safety) from the above. They also need them relatively quickly – two, three, or at MOST four turns after Pearl Harbor before the massive Allied production thwarts further advancement and starts taking VP back. Complicating a quick capture of any of the above VP is that the Japs typically must invest the first two (or more) turns taking the eight VP that gets them to the 18 VP value.

Unfortunately, which of #1 - #5 above are easiest to acquire is not possible to exactly formulate because it depends on how well the Brits and US have been able to invest in and prepare a Pacific Theatre defense. It does seem generally possible for the Japs to pretty much guarantee putting Australia and/or Hawaii out of supply if they focus on that. However, the Brits and US do have counter-moves if they anticipate such early Jap moves.

At the moment, I favor threatening to put Hawaii and Australia out of supply the turn after Pearl Harbor, followed by an assault on one of them the subsequent turn if at all feasible. I am currently thinking it might even be worthwhile to use the troops garrisoning Indonesia if needed to take Australia if that would enable Australia to be held for the two/three-turn window required for victory. This leaves the Japs stretched awfully thin across the Pacific through summer 1942 and does not allow for Brit/US counter-moves, so nothing can really be cast in concrete.

If Hawaii is reasonably well defended, then take Midway and Kiska instead. (It is not at all clear that Kiska can be seriously held more than one turn, but it is a threat forcing at least a bit of an early US diversion.)  If the Brits and US have relatively heavily defended Hawaii, Australia, and/or the Southwest Pacific (New Guinea, Guadalcanal), then that should have left India open. If everything (i.e., #1 - #3 from above) is well-defended everywhere, then the Germans have failed to knock the Brits back on their keister in the Battle of the Atlantic, so blame them for Jap failures. The VP at Midway seems an important key as neither Australia nor Hawaii get to 21 VP by themselves and which means a loaded transport is probably mandatory to accompany the Pearl Harbor attack.

A late 1942 attack against India only seems possible if the Germans have crunched the Brits and/or the Middle East, as it takes so little to stop the Japs at Calcutta and it is relatively difficult to put it out of supply. An India assault also seems likely to preclude seriously threatening Australia or Hawaii. However, of course the Japs can pick up the required extra three VP by taking both Calcutta and Ceylon, and so do not need anything else – Midway would be nice insurance in this case.

Summary

It seems the Japs are extremely dependent upon a vigorous prosecution of the Battle of the Atlantic if they are to have any real chance on their side of things.  As such, even though a heavy sub investment may not really be in the Germans best interest, it seems mandatory for any kind of reasonable shot at Axis victory. And the way a vigorous commerce war works, it is at least almost certain that the Germans will do no worse than break even in terms of what they invest in subs versus what the Brits lose in production. This all presumes that Barbarosa is no longer an absolute German priority.

My current feeling is that the above outlines the best chance that the Axis has of actually forcing a victory. However, in my experience and absent the ever present dominance of the dice, the Axis are still way down in odds on being able to pull off victory without significant help from some sort of significant Allied missteps. I will admit that Allied missteps do in fact often happen - it seems to be pretty darn difficult for the Allies to coordinate the balance of requirements as precisely as the game demands. Coupled with the many random factors that can significantly influence the outcome (e.g., timing of the fall of France, minor Axis ally triggers, and which way French fleet loyalties align), each game seems always an unknown and open possibility as to victor.

dd

35
Strategy Tips / Re: U.S. (Pacific Theatre)
« on: December 14, 2005, 10:12:19 AM »
I think the US really should start building the three factories right out of the gate so that they get the slight extra bump of production after the first year, and more importantly, so that in the second year of the game they need then only be building two factories (rather than three) and will have more freed-up production to actually lend lease when the Brits REALLY need it.  I also am greatly in favor of the US building two carriers by Pearl Harbor so that they have pretty immediate options to pressure the Japanese from mid-1942 onwards.  This of course means I don't favor too much lend lease (maybe a few points a turn the first year and five or so per turn the second year). I have to feel that those  lend-lease points are generally better used to prepare against the Japanese. 

And I've said it before and I'll say it again - lend leasing the Chinese is a waste - every lend lease point up in the Chinese mountains is one less point to stop or slow the Japanese in the Pacific.  With patience, the Chinese can get by quite enough well entirely on their own, thank you.  Everytime I've run them they pretty much have kicked Japan all but off the mainland by early 1944 without so much as a buck of lend lease.  Doing so does require immediately falling back to the mountains at the start of the game and enormous patience, waiting for the right timing to come out of the mountains.  And yes, it is frustrating to spend four years hiding in the mountains and being kicked in the teeth by the Japanese (particularly their air force). But what the heck, they're only Chinese... ;-)

I used to think building two additional US carriers was a good idea (i.e., a total force of six carriers). However, I'm not sure of that now as island hopping in the Central and Southeast Pacific seems to work pretty well without carriers because the islands are so close together.  This may also be true in the Southwest Pacific, but the jury's still out on this for me as it's nice to have the option of by-passing Jap islands to bring pressure directly against Jap fleet units. 

I do like a strong force of US carriers (four at least), because the alternative, having no or few carriers, pretty much mandates an island hopping campaign to capture air bases to provide air cover. Having many carriers allows the US to early go for a Jap jugular.  With eight fighters on board a task force (plus four more flowing in a veritably infinite pipeline as immediate replacements), the US is capable of taking on ten, eleven, or even twelve Japanese fighters in a showdown fight - and this all in late 1942 / early 1943 if the US builds are correctly orchestrated.

If relevant, at the stroke of Pearl Harbor, I also like to rush all the US carriers into the Atlantic for two turns to break the back of any 1942 U-boat offensive that might be going on. Usually during these early US turns there's little the US fleet can do in the Pacific anyway except be a tempting morsel to the Combined Japanese fleet (though Mark begs to differ with me on this, I think, as I believe he's inclined to rush to the defense of Australia and which does have its points).

Currently, I think it's critical the US and the Brits get extra infantry into the Pacific before Pearl Harbor to be able to garrison as many victory point spots as possible and to act as speed bumps to Japanese amphibious advances.  Every un-garrisoned island is sooo much easier for the Japs to take than one with even a single infantry defender.  However, this last game I was totally out-flanked by Mark's Japanese even having got my infantry out to the Solomons & Philippines - somehow he just elegantly side-stepped, swatted down or crushed everything I threw in his path, so maybe I need to rethink this. On the other hand, he never was able to seriously threaten any of the US island possessions (Hawaii, Midway, Aleutians, etc.).  Australia was a different matter...

Lastly and perhaps most importantly, my major Pacific US strategy is to max out on subs and fighters with which you inundate the Japs.  The last several times I've tried this, the Japs were all but brought to their knees by mid or late 1943. And 1944 turns into an absolute cake walk.  Of course, it means the Brits are responsible for their own fighter defense in 1942 and at least part of 1943 (you can't have everything, I guess).

I found that in this last game I did not have to build even a single US surface combat vessel - just transports, subs, and the couple of carriers.  (It helped that the wimpy U-boat war never required a serious need for Atlantic DDs.) I found that fighters and a couple of carriers and a shoe string budget of a few loaded transports was enough to dominate much of the Pacific by mid-1943.  All those subs pretty much drive Japanese production to zero by late '42 / early '43. Even when the bugger kills the poor subs twice as often as he should... (grrr).

So, it seems many good things happen with this Pacific strategy, even given gross British naval incompetence that allowed Italian raiders out into the South Atlantic in early 1943 to put most of the US fleet out of supply for nine months straight (grrrr!!!). Next time we will NOT rely on the Brits to keep our supply lines open (grrrr!!!!@#!).

The fact that the US lost Australia  for the Brits is of course not relevant to the discussion...

dd

36
Strategy Tips / Re: To build factories or not to build factories
« on: November 03, 2005, 07:41:48 AM »
Deciding to build factories costing 24 bucks is a tough one... That being acknowledged, I'll admit to a weakness to starting factories immediately out of the gate (or not later than turn two) for Germany (2), Japan (1), and Brittain (1).  They are a painful early expense, but early is the ONLY time they make sense.  And once you have them, they keep paying and paying and paying.  Not massively, but worth the break-even costs I think.  This assumes of course that you aren't in a position where that early 24 points is a make/break issue (a la Italy).

The comment about using the 24 pts to capture five extra production points instead of factory building makes absolute sense.  However, I'm not sure I've ever seen a place where four armor units (or equivalent), will earn five production points that you wouldn't otherwise capture anyway.

dd

37
Strategy Tips / Re: Japan--General Strategy
« on: November 03, 2005, 07:36:32 AM »
Build fighters, build fighters, build fighters.  No joke - Japan can wind up with between 15 and 20 fighters by the time of Pearl Harbor. Unless the US starts to counter the move from VERY EARLY,  it's not until late '43 or early '44 that the US can even start to seriously contest the Pacific. 

Oh, and don't get sucked into China - clean up the coast and push the chinks back into the mountains as cheaply and quickly as possible.  Be grateful for every buck the US lend leases China the first year - painful though it may be, that's one buck stuck up in the mountains of China that was not spent to slow down early Nip pacific domination.

dd

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